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JUDGES BOUND BY THE LAW: A CASE STUDY OF THE 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL MISAPPLICATION OF THE JUDICIAL 
CONDUCT AND DISABILITY ACT OF 1980 AND A PROPOSAL TO 
PREVENT FUTURE MISAPPLICATIONS 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Perhaps no single institution embodies the American notion of justice more 
than the judiciary.  To the layperson and lawyer alike, judges are expected to 
apply the law evenhandedly to the situation before them and to resolve 
disputes in an expeditious and competent manner.  Theoretically and 
practically, the American system of jurisprudence relies upon judges’ abilities 
to accurately marshal principles of law, to shepherd those who come before the 
courts either as litigants or witnesses, and to ensure that findings of fact are 
supported by appropriate evidentiary bases.  To label judges the cornerstones 
of the American justice system is not mere hyperbole given their 
responsibilities in any given case. 
The problem, of course, is that judges are no more infallible than any other 
person who transverses the gates of a courtroom.  The fact that judgeships are 
jobs essential to the unremitting operation of the government does not mean 
that those who occupy the positions are impervious to mistakes that inevitably 
occur in any profession.  Sometimes, however, a judge does not simply 
mistakenly apply the law or wrongfully vituperate an officer of the court.  It is 
possible, after all, that a judge may view his position, with all its 
accoutrements of a monarchy limited to one room, in such a manner as to 
abrogate his responsibilities by engaging in conduct that is inimical to the 
administration of justice.  Accompanying the power of the judiciary is the very 
real possibility for institutionalized despotism—i.e., a pattern of judicial 
misconduct that is so inveterate to a particular court as to have inured into an 
effective obstruction of justice by inhibiting litigants and destroying efficient 
adjudication of claims.  Certainly judges are exposed to enticing temptations, 
and as the federal judiciary continues to grow the possibilities for misconduct 
become more and more prevalent. 
In an attempt to suppress these possibilities while reinforcing the role of 
judges qua public servants, Congress enacted the Judicial Conduct and 
Disability Act of 1980 (the Act),1 which created a mechanism for investigating 
 
 1. Pub. L. No. 96-458, 94 Stat. 2036 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(2000)). 
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and disciplining federal judges whose conduct is “prejudicial to the effective 
and expeditious administration of the business of the courts.”2  The Act 
clarified the previously unresolved issue of whether a judicial council, initially 
created to administer the business of the courts within its circuit, had the power 
under section 332 to censure a judge for judicial misconduct.3  In addition, 
section 372(c)(6)(b) of the Act enumerates the sanctions that a judicial council 
may impose in the event that it finds a judge has committed an act egregious 
enough to fall under the statutory language.4 
Perhaps the most significant application of the Act since its inception 
occurred when the Judicial Council of the Fifth Circuit, investigated and 
disciplined Judge John H. McBryde of the Northern District of Texas in 1997.5  
While Judge McBryde’s story certainly entails conduct that is questionable to 
even those imbued with court experience, it also entails a tenuous application 
of the very statute that was enacted in order to prevent the judiciary from 
overstepping its constitutional bounds.6  In McBryde IV, the Court of Appeals 
for the D.C. Circuit held that the Act was constitutional, both facially and as 
applied by the Judicial Council to Judge McBryde.7  The majority decision in 
McBryde IV allows for unconstitutional applications of the Act by holding that 
the review preclusion clause effectively bars review in the courts of as-applied 
constitutional challenges and by implicitly upholding the nebulous standard 
outlined in the Act.8  This Note will review the facts that supported the Judicial 
Council’s imposition of disciplinary action on Judge McBryde; Part III will 
recount the history leading up to the Act and restate the provisions of the Act 
 
 2. Id. 
 3. In re McBryde, 117 F.3d 208, 226-27 (5th Cir. 1997) [hereinafter McBryde I].  For the 
purposes of this article and for the sake of clarity, the Texas cases involving Judge McBryde will 
be distinguished from the D.C. cases as follows: In re McBryde, 120 F.3d 519 (5th Cir. 1997) 
[hereinafter McBryde II]; McBryde v. Comm. to Review Circuit Council Conduct & Disability 
Orders of the Judicial Conference of the United States, 83 F. Supp. 135 (D.D.C. 1999) 
[hereinafter McBryde III]; McBryde v. Comm. to Review Circuit Council Conduct & Disability 
Orders of the Judicial Conference of the United States, 264 F.3d 52 (D.C. Cir. 2001) [hereinafter 
McBryde IV]. 
 4. See § 372(c)(6)(b). 
 5. For a complete recitation of the facts leading up to the disciplinary proceedings leveled 
against Judge McBryde, see McBryde I, 117 F.3d at 209-17; McBryde III, 83 F. Supp. at 140-49. 
 6. For a discussion of the purposes of the Act, see infra Part III(A). 
 7. McBryde IV, 264 F.3d at 55. 
 8. The standard employed in the Act appears in § 372(c)(1): 
Any person alleging that a circuit, district, or bankruptcy judge, or a magistrate, has 
engaged in  conduct prejudicial to the effective and expeditious administration of the 
business of the courts, or alleging that such judge or magistrate is unable to discharge all 
the duties of office by reason of mental or physical disability, may file with the clerk of 
the court of appeals for the circuit a written complaint containing a brief statement of the 
facts constituting such conduct. (emphasis added). 
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germane to the McBryde saga; Part IV will then develop the lines of analysis 
the majority and dissent relied upon in McBryde IV; and finally Part V will 
analyze the constitutionality of the Act, focusing specifically on the preclusion 
clause9 and on the standard delineated in the Act, and will conclude with a 
proposed standard to be applied by judicial councils faced with complaints 
filed under the Act. 
II.  THE STORY OF JUDGE JOHN H. MCBRYDE 
Judge McBryde, United States District Judge for the Northern District of 
Texas, began to encounter opposition to the manner in which he conducted 
judicial proceedings in spring of 1995.10  At this time two cases, United States 
v. Satz11 and Torres v. Trinity Industries, Inc.,12 were pending before Judge 
McBryde.13  These cases sparked an investigation of Judge McBryde and his 
notoriously stringent methods of operating14 that will in all likelihood not end 
until reviewed as a last resort by the Supreme Court. 
The Satz case arose out of an investigation into an organization that 
fraudulently provided loan referrals to individuals with substandard credit.15  
The organization thrived by charging the individuals an advance referral fee 
and by operating in numerous states.16  Satz was indicted in both Phoenix, 
Arizona and Fort Worth, Texas.17  Following a plea bargain by three of Satz’s 
co-conspirators, Judge Rosenblatt in Arizona issued a sealing order for all 
matters pertaining to the plea proceeding.18  Judge McBryde wished to go 
forward with sentencing in Texas, thereby denying Assistant United States 
Attorney Umphres’ motion for a continuance.19  Through a series of hearings 
to resolve Umphres’ motions, Judge McBryde learned that the State was 
looking for a continuance to allow time for the Arizona investigation to expand 
and to avoid possible issues of double jeopardy.20  He ultimately found 
 
 9. Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-458, 94 Stat. 2036 (codified 
as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(10)).  See infra note 44. 
 10. McBryde I, 117 F.3d at 209-11, 214-15. 
 11. The facts pertaining to the organization and its scheme of which Satz was a part are 
detailed in United States v. Gray, 105 F.3d 956, 961-62 (5th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 
1150 (1997). 
 12. Torres v. Trinity Indus., Inc., No. 4:90-CV-812-A (N.D. Tex. 1995), available at 
http://pacer.txnd.uscourts.gov. 
 13. McBryde I, 117 F.3d at 209. 
 14. See McBryde III, 83 F. Supp. at 142. 
 15. See supra note 11. 
 16. Id. 
 17. McBryde I, 117 F.3d at 209. 
 18. Id. at 210. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 211. 
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Phoenix AUSA Cerow in contempt of court for failure to answer questions 
pertaining to the sealing order in an attempt to have sentencing occur in 
Arizona first.21  Judge McBryde, moreover, found that no sealing order in fact 
existed in Arizona, based on the demeanor of Cerow and Umphres and in spite 
of correspondence by Judge Rosenblatt expressly indicating the contrary.22  
Finally, Judge McBryde ordered the text of Umphres’ motion, which included 
information that had been sealed by Judge Rosenblatt regarding the co-
conspirators’ guilty pleas and their willingness to assist prosecutors, revealed 
to Satz and his counsel.23 
The Torres case arose out of the death of Raimundo Torres, and resulted in 
a settlement reached by the parties.24  The final judgment ordered the 
defendant to pay Grecia Torres, at the time a minor, $40,000 and the Clerk of 
the Northern District to invest the money in an interest bearing account at the 
highest available interest rate until Grecia Torres reached maturity.25  
Following a communication breakdown between plaintiff’s attorneys and a 
financial deputy for the Court, the $40,000 mistakenly rested in the court’s 
treasury for more than three years, earning no interest.26  The office of Nancy 
Doherty, Clerk of the Northern District, discovered the mistake and Doherty 
alerted Judge McBryde.27  Based on the advice and assistance of the 
Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Doherty sought to 
reimburse Torres’ account via a Federal Tort Claims Act28 action.29  Judge 
McBryde disagreed, and maintained that Torres should be made whole through 
the court.30  Accordingly, he ordered Doherty to file an analysis supported by 
documentation to determine the amount of interest Torres had lost.31  At the 
suggestion of Judge Buchmeyer, Chief Judge of the Northern District of Texas, 
Doherty wrote a letter to Judge McBryde expressing shock and disappointment 
that Judge McBryde believed it to be necessary to enter an order to compensate 
Torres.32  Judge McBryde responded with an order striking Doherty’s letter as 
 
 21. Id. at 213. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 214. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Federal Tort Claims Act, ch. 753, 60 Stat. 842 (1946) (codified as amended at  28 U.S.C. 
§§ 2671-2680 (1999)). 
 29. McBryde I, 117 F.3d at 214. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
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bordering on, if not constituting, contempt and demanding that she file the 
requested documentation calculating the lost interest.33 
Shortly after these events concerning the Satz and Torres cases, Judge 
Buchmeyer entered orders vacating Judge McBryde’s orders and reassigned 
both cases to himself.34  A month later, Judge Politz, Chief Judge of the Fifth 
Circuit and Chairman of the Judicial Council of the Fifth Circuit, convened a 
meeting with Judge McBryde and Judge Buchmeyer to attempt to resolve the 
disputes surrounding Satz and Torres.35  Judge McBryde declared that he 
would seek the assistance of the Judicial Council in returning the two cases to 
his docket, to which Judge Politz replied that such a request would result in a 
plenary investigation of Judge McBryde’s career as a judge.36  Nevertheless, 
Judge McBryde filed a request for assistance in June 1995, one month prior to 
the filing of a complaint by an attorney with the Judicial Council.37 
Pursuant to section 372(c),38 Judge Politz appointed a Special Committee 
to investigate the allegations of malfeasance.39  As a reaction to the swelling 
number of complaints of Judge McBryde’s abusive and excessive conduct, 
Judge Politz elected to expand the scope of the investigation pursuant to 
section 372(c)(5).40  After reviewing evidence regarding numerous incidents 
spanning Judge McBryde’s career as a judge, the Special Committee identified 
five categories in which Judge McBryde’s pattern of conduct could be placed: 
(1) proclivity to question authority; (2) overreactions and abusive sanctions; 
(3) obsessive need to control; (4) inappropriate conduct towards fellow judges; 
and (5) effect on the legal community.41  Ultimately, the Special Committee 
recommended that Judge McBryde either retire voluntarily or face sanctions, 
viz. a public reprimand, suspension of all new assignments for one year, and 
disqualification for three years in any case involving a lawyer whom the 
Special Committee had identified as a potential witness at its hearing.42 
The Judicial Council for the Fifth Circuit adopted the Special Committee’s 
findings of fact and recommendations as to appropriate sanctions.43  Judge 
McBryde thereafter filed seven petitions for review with the Committee to 
Review Circuit Council Conduct and Disability Orders of the Judicial 
 
 33. Id. at 215. 
 34. Id. 
 35. McBryde III, 83 F. Supp. at 142. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. See infra Part III(B). 
 39. McBryde III, 83 F. Supp. at 142. 
 40. Id. at 143. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 147. 
 43. Id. at 147-48. 
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Conference of the United States (the Review Committee) pursuant to section 
372(c)(10).44  The Review Committee substantially affirmed the Judicial 
Council’s order, though authorizing the Judicial Council to lift the one-year 
period of Judge McBryde’s new case assignment sanction if it found Judge 
McBryde’s behavior demonstrated that he had engaged in honest reflection and 
self-appraisal to improve his conduct and that he had made substantial progress 
towards that end.45 
Judge McBryde turned to the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Columbia to challenge the constitutionality of the Act both facially and as 
applied.46  The district court held the Act not facially unconstitutional under 
the separation of powers doctrine, insofar as the powers exercised by the 
judicial branch under the auspices of the Act are compatible with the central 
aim of the branch—the administration of justice by equitable applications of 
the law.47  In addition, the district court declared that no other branch of 
government could perform the Act’s essential monitoring function without 
raising grave separation of powers objections.48  In construing the finality 
clause of the Act, section 372(c)(10),49 the court found that the Act precluded 
review of Judge McBryde’s statutory claims, however his right to challenge 
the constitutionality of the Act, both facially and as-applied, remained intact.50  
 
 44. Id. at 149.  Section 372(c)(10) provides: 
A complainant, judge, or magistrate aggrieved by a final order of the chief judge under 
paragraph (3) of this subsection may petition the judicial council for review thereof.  A 
complainant, judge, or magistrate aggrieved by an action of the judicial council under 
paragraph (6) of this subsection may petition the Judicial Conference of the United States 
for review thereof.  The Judicial Conference, or the standing committee established under 
section 331 of this title, may grant a petition filed by a complainant, judge, or magistrate 
under this paragraph.  Except as expressly provided in this paragraph, all orders and 
determinations, including denials of petitions for review, shall be final and conclusive and 
shall not be judicially reviewable on appeal or otherwise. 
 45. McBryde III, 83 F. Supp. at 149. 
 46. Id. at 139.  Judge McBryde’s complaint rested on the grounds that the Act violates the 
separation of powers doctrine both facially and as-applied, fails to accord him due process of law 
in its application, and violates the First Amendment.  Furthermore, Judge McBryde argued that 
the proceedings against him violated the Act and the Fifth Circuit’s Complaint Rules. 
 47. Id. at 155 (citing Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 388 (1989)). 
 48. Id. (citing In re Certain Complaints Under Investigation by an Investigating Comm. of 
the Judicial Council of the Eleventh Circuit, 783 F.2d 1488, 1505 (11th Cir. 1986)). 
 49. See supra note 44. 
 50. The District Court based its conclusion on language found in three D.C. cases involving 
the infamous Judge Hastings—Hastings v. Judicial Conference of the United States, 593 F. Supp. 
1371, 1378 (D.D.C. 1984) (holding that the “Act does not bar judicial review of the facial validity 
of the statute itself”), aff’d in part and vacated in part, 770 F.2d 1093, 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1985) 
(Edwards, J., concurring) (raising issues regarding any interpretation of § 372(c)(10) that would 
preclude constitutional claims) [hereinafter Hastings I]; Hastings v. Judicial Conference of the 
United States, 829 F.2d 91, 108 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (on the issue of whether the court could pass on 
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Turning then to the Act as applied by the Judicial Council, the district court 
concluded that the Act was not unconstitutionally applied because the 
investigation of Judge McBryde did not enter into the protected sphere of 
judicial decision making through an inquiry into the merits of Judge 
McBryde’s rulings and because Judge McBryde was not effectively removed 
from office.51 
Having unsuccessfully petitioned the D.C. District Court for relief from the 
Review Committee’s Order, Judge McBryde appealed.52  Before turning to the 
majority and dissenting opinions in McBryde IV, however, it may be helpful to 
briefly survey the legislative history of the Act and its relevant provisions vis-
à-vis Judge McBryde. 
III.  The Act 
A. History of the Act 
Congress created the judicial councils53 for each circuit in 1939 with the 
enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 448,54 which dictated that at least twice a year a 
council composed of circuit judges, led by the senior circuit judge, would 
convene to ensure the proper administration of the business of their respective 
courts.55  Congress recodified and revised this legislation in 1948 when it 
enacted 28 U.S.C. § 332,56 which provided in part that “[e]ach judicial council 
shall make all necessary orders for the effective and expeditious administration 
of the business of the courts within its circuit.”57  Every employee and officer 
of the circuit, including, of course, the circuit judges, must “promptly carry 
into effect all orders of the judicial circuit.”58 
 
plaintiff’s due process challenges to the Act as-applied, noting that “sensitive and unsettled 
questions of constitutional law would arise if the challenged actions are covered by the 
prohibition on judicial review”). 
 51. McBryde III, 83 F. Supp. at 159-65. 
 52. On appeal, Judge McBryde repeated the essence of his arguments raised before the D.C. 
District Court, save his First Amendment argument, which the District Court accepted.  McBryde 
IV, 264 F.3d at 55. 
 53. For extensive background relating to judicial councils, see PETER GRAHAM FISH, THE 
POLITICS OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION (1973); see also Peter G. Fish, The Circuit 
Councils: Rusty Hinges of Federal Judicial Administration, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 203 (1970). 
 54. Act effective Aug. 7. 1939, ch. 501, 53 Stat. 1223 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.  
332 (1946)). 
 55. McBryde I, 117 F.3d at 226. 
 56. Id. 
 57. 28 U.S.C. § 332(d)(1) (Supp. II 1996). 
 58. § 332(d)(2). 
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The statutory conferral of authority to judicial councils was challenged in 
Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit.59  The Judicial Council of 
the Tenth Circuit in Chandler convened in a special session and found that 
Judge Chandler was unable to “discharge efficiently the duties of his office.”  
Thus, the Judicial Council ordered, pursuant to section 332, that all cases filed 
after December 28, 1965 be assigned to other judges.60  Judge Chandler, a 
district court judge, challenged the authority of the Judicial Council to issue 
such an order and petitioned the Supreme Court for an extraordinary writ, 
arguing that the Council usurped congressional impeachment power.61  
Although the Court rejected the petition for an extraordinary writ,62 Chandler 
has become a seminal decision for judicial scholars because it marked the 
inception of the debate over the dynamic between judicial independence and 
the need for accountability to ensure the effective and expeditious 
administration of the courts.63 
In 1978, in the wake of incessant criticism of the judicial councils, 
Senators Nunn and Deconcini co-sponsored S. 1423,64 a bill that included 
removal, a Judicial Conduct and Disability Commission, and a Court on 
Judicial Conduct and Disability.  Although the Judicial Conference of the 
United States (the Judicial Conference)65 approved S. 142366 and the Senate 
 
 59. 398 U.S. 74 (1970). 
 60. Chandler, 398 U.S. at 77-81. 
 61. Id. at 82. 
 62. Id. at 86-88. 
 63. Chief Justice Burger argued that impeachment cannot be the only means of sanctioning 
judges that refuse to abide by the “reasonable, proper, and necessary” rules promulgated by 
judicial councils to establish orderly administration of court business.  Id. at 85.  Justice Harlan, 
in concurrence, conceded the profound importance of judicial independence in the American 
scheme of government, but noted that there existed “no incursion on that principle in the 
legislation creating the Judicial Councils and empowering them to supervise the work of the 
district courts, in order to ensure the effective and expeditious handling of their business.”  Id. at 
129. Justices Douglas and Black, on the other hand, emphasized the all-encompassing 
independence of judges and maintained that judicial councils infringe upon the constitutionally 
mandated impeachment power of Congress.  Id. at 136, 141-42. 
 64. 95th Cong. (1978). 
 65. The Judicial Conference of the United States was established under 28 U.S.C. § 331 
(1993), which states that the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court must summon 
annually the chief judge of each circuit to a conference that will survey the condition of the 
courts, make appropriate recommendations, and exercise authority pursuant to § 372(c).  Either 
the Judicial Conference or a standing committee of the Conference may hold hearings and issue 
orders as necessary to accomplish its duties. 
 66. Suggested amendments and a constitutional warning regarding removal accompanied 
Conference approval.  See Stephen B. Burbank, Procedural Rulemaking Under the Judicial 
Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 283, 293 
(1982). 
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passed it, the House balked at the Nunn/Deconcini bill, perhaps because 
enacting the bill would have in effect rejected the contention held by the 
organized federal judiciary that it was capable of self-regulation within the 
existing structure.67  Indeed, the bill hardly espoused the notion of 
decentralized judicial administration that remained constant since the nascence 
of judicial councils.68  In the aftermath of S. 1423, Senators Bayh and Kennedy 
each introduced bills69 that rejected removal by methods outside of those 
enumerated in the Constitution while embracing the idea that resolution of 
allegations of less-than-impeachable malfeasance may be accomplished by the 
judiciary acting through existing machinery.70 
Although the Nunn/Deconcini bill and the alternatives proposed by 
Senators Bayh and Kennedy ultimately failed to garner support, continued 
doubts about the adequacy of existing procedures caused members of the 
Senate to cooperate with representatives of the Judicial Conference in drafting 
a new bill, S.1873.71  The bill departed from the Nunn/Deconcini conception 
insofar as it refused to authorize removal and it provided the judicial councils 
with primary responsibility.72  The considerable moderation, however, of S. 
1873 proved to be insufficient for the Judicial Conference, which elected not to 
accept the bill due to its divergence from the model of federal judicial 
administration.73  The bill would have recreated the special Article III court 
first conceived in the Nunn/DeConcini bill, the Court on Judicial Conduct and 
Disability, which was to be endowed with the power to review misconduct 
findings of the judicial councils de novo.74  In the face of stout Judicial 
Conference opposition, S. 1873 passed with considerable difficulty on the 
Senate floor.75 
The House used H.R. 6330,76 which the Judicial Conference had approved, 
as its paradigm in drafting legislation aimed at the judiciary.77  Like the Bayh 
and Kennedy bills, H.R. 6330 imparted upon the judicial councils primary 
responsibility to settle complaints of judicial misconduct or disability.78  The 
Bayh bill and H.R. 6330, moreover, featured initial screening of complaints by 
 
 67. Burbank, supra note 66, at 293-94. 
 68. Id. 
 69. S. 522, 96th Cong. (1979); S. 678, 96th Cong. (1979), respectively. 
 70. Burbank, supra note 66, at 294. 
 71. 96th Cong. (1979). 
 72. Burbank, supra note 66, at 297. 
 73. Id. 
 74. S. 1873 § 2(a). 
 75. See 125 CONG. REC. 30,052-53 (1979).  The bill passed 56-33, with 11 Senators not 
voting.  Id. at 30,100. 
 76. 96th Cong. (1980). 
 77. Burbank, supra note 66, at 300. 
 78. Id. 
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the chief judge as a means of economical, informal, and collegial resolution of 
complaints.79  Keeping the analytical framework of H.R. 6330 in mind, it is no 
surprise that the House version of S. 1873 eviscerated the Court on Judicial 
Conduct and Disability and called instead for review of council findings by the 
Judicial Conference.80  The House Judiciary Committee expressed concern 
over the formality of a special court and its propensity to invite excessive 
complaints against judges, thereby threatening judicial independence.81 
Signed into law by President Carter on October 15, 1980,82 the Act was 
designed to establish a mechanism and procedures within the federal judiciary 
to consider and reply to complaints against particular judges.83  Congress also 
wished to revise the composition of the judicial councils of each circuit, while 
simultaneously affirming the authority of both the councils and the Judicial 
Conference in the sphere of judicial discipline and disability.84  The Act sought 
to enhance judicial ethics and accountability, to bolster the tenet that the 
appearance of justice is crucial to the American justice system, and to preserve 
the autonomy of the judiciary.85 
B. Provisions of the Act 
The Act provides for investigation by the federal judiciary of charges that a 
circuit, district, or bankruptcy judge or magistrate has engaged in conduct 
detrimental to the effective and efficient administration of the duties of the 
courts.86  Under the provisions germane to this Note, any person alleging such 
conduct may file with the Circuit Court of Appeals a written complaint 
containing a cursory statement of the facts comprising the conduct.87  The chief 
judge of the circuit reviews the complaint “expeditiously” and then may 
choose one of three options.88  Initially, the chief judge may dismiss the 
complaint: (1) when it fails to conform to procedural requirements; (2) when it 
 
 79. Id. 
 80. H.R. 7974, 96th Cong. § 3(c)(10) (1980). 
 81. See H.R. REP. NO. 96-1313, at 18 (1980): 
In essence, the Committee rejected the special court feature of S. 1873 and certain other of its 
features because creation of a system in which complaints against federal judges could be so 
easily pressed to a formal adversary accusatorial proceeding raised the dangers of a substantial 
chilling effect on judicial independence, as well as the danger of infliction of harm and disruption 
of the administration of justice. 
 82. See Edward D. Re, Judicial Independence and Accountability: The Judicial Councils 
Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, 8 N. KY. L. REV. 221, 243 (1981). 
 83. H.R. REP. NO. 96-1313, at 1. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. See § 372(c)(1). 
 87. § 372(c)(1). 
 88. § 372(c)(3). 
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directly relates to the merits of a decision or procedural ruling; or (3) when it is 
frivolous.89  Alternatively, the chief judge may conclude the proceeding upon a 
finding that suitable corrective action has been taken or that superseding events 
render action on the complaint unnecessary.90  Lastly, the chief judge may 
choose neither of these options, in which case she shall appoint herself and an 
equal number of circuit and district judges of the circuit to a special committee 
to probe the facts and allegations of the complaint.91 
Once a special committee is appointed, the Act dictates that it shall 
conduct an investigation to such an extent as it deems necessary and shall 
quickly thereafter file a report with the judicial council of the circuit.92  The 
report must exhibit both the findings of the investigation and the committee’s 
proposals for necessary and proper action by the judicial council.93  Upon 
receipt of this report, the judicial council may spearhead any additional 
investigation which it considers necessary and shall take such action as it 
deems appropriate to ensure the effective and expeditious administration of the 
matters of the courts within the circuit.94 
A party aggrieved by a final order of the chief judge may petition the 
judicial council for review, while a party aggrieved by an action of the judicial 
council may petition the Judicial Conference for review.95  The Judicial 
Conference has discretion to grant or deny a petition for review, and its orders 
and resolutions are final and therefore not subject to judicial review.96 
IV.  THE MAJORITY AND DISSENTING OPINIONS IN MCBRYDE IV 
 
 89. § 372(c)(3)(A). 
 90. § 372(c)(3)(B). 
 91. § 372(c)(4). 
 92. § 372(c)(5). 
 93. Id. 
 94. § 372(c)(6).  This provision also outlines seven available courses of action for a judicial 
council to take, though the list is not meant to be exhaustive: (1) direct the chief judge of the 
district of the magistrate whose conduct is the focus of the complaint to take such action as the 
judicial council considers proper; (2) certify disability of a judge whose conduct is the focus of 
the complaint pursuant to the procedures and standards enumerated under subsection (b) of §372; 
(3) request that any judge voluntarily retire; (4) order that no further cases be assigned to any 
judge whose conduct is the focus of the complaint on an impermanent basis for a specified time; 
(5) admonish such judge privately; (6) admonish such judge publicly; or (7) order any other 
action the council deems appropriate, notwithstanding removal.  Id.  The first three options relate 
either to magistrates or to judges eligible for retirement.  Additional provisions of the Act allow a 
judicial council to refer any complaint to the Judicial Conference and in those cases entailing 
impeachable offenses require such action.  See § 372(c)(7). 
 95. § 372(c)(10); see supra note 44. 
 96. Id. 
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A. The Majority Opinion 
The majority opinion in McBryde IV, written by D.C. Circuit Judge 
Williams, began by determining that Judge McBryde’s claims were moot 
insofar as they related to the one-year suspension and the three-year 
disqualification.97  The majority found that, since both the suspension and 
disqualification had expired, no relief sought by McBryde from the Fifth 
Circuit would return the cases to him he was not assigned or “otherwise 
improve his current situation.”98  In discussing mootness and standing, Judge 
Williams stated that McBryde attacked the Special Committee’s report as 
vague because it provided insufficient notice of what constitutes prohibited 
conduct.99  He concluded, however, that the fundamental standard sought to be 
enforced by the Review Committee and the Judicial Council of the Fifth 
Circuit was clearly ascertainable.100  The standard, announced in the Order of 
the Judicial Council, states that “a judge should demonstrate at least a 
modicum of civility and respect towards the professionals with whom he or she 
works.”101 
The court encountered two jurisdictional issues—whether McBryde lacked 
standing and the scope of the applicability of the review preclusion clause of 
the Act.102  Addressing Judge McBryde’s facial constitutionality claims first, 
the majority compared the preclusive language of section 372(c)(10) with the 
statutory language construed in Johnson v. Robinson103 and determined that 
section 372(c)(10) did not deny jurisdiction over facial challenges.104  Turning 
then to the question of whether Judge McBryde’s as-applied constitutionality 
claims were barred under section 372(c)(10), Judge Williams relied heavily 
upon a series of D.C. Circuit cases known as the Ralpho trilogy and upon the 
legislative history of the Act.105 
 
 97. McBryde IV, 264 F.3d at 55. 
 98. Id.  The one-year suspension expired on September 18, 1999, while the three-year 
disqualification expired on February 6, 2001.  Id.  The majority went on to find that Judge 
McBryde’s claims were not moot insofar as they related to the public reprimand because of the 
reprimand’s stigmatizing effect.  Id. at 56-57. 
 99. Id. at 56. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 58. 
 103. 415 U.S. 361, 367-68 (1974) (construing then-applicable version of 38 U.S.C. § 211(a), 
which provided that decisions of the Veteran’s Administration on any question of law or fact 
under certain laws shall be final and conclusive, and holding that § 211(a) had no application to 
challenges to the constitutionality of the statutes in question). 
 104. McBryde IV, 264 F.3d at 58. 
 105. Id. at 59-63. 
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The Ralpho trilogy, Griffith v. FLRA,106 Ungar v. Smith,107 and Ralpho v. 
Bell,108 stands for the principle that courts should find preclusion of review for 
as-applied and facial constitutional challenges only if evidence exists to show 
clear and convincing congressional intent to preclude.109  In each case, broad 
and ostensibly comprehensive statutory language barring review faced the D.C. 
Circuit.110  In the absence of unequivocal statutory language precluding review 
of constitutional claims, the D.C. Circuit chose in all three cases to analyze the 
legislative history.111  In each case, furthermore, the court found the clear and 
convincing standard unsatisfied.112 
The legislative history of the Act, the majority argued, exhibits concern 
over the issue articulated in Robinson, i.e., the constitutional implications of a 
federal statute that denies any judicial forum for a viable constitutional claim, 
and illustrates a congressional effort to ensure that sufficient review would 
occur in practice through the Act’s mechanisms.113  The Court on Judicial 
Conduct and Disability, envisioned in S. 1873,114 was to be the constitutional 
safeguard for the Act against Robinson attacks.115  When the House version 
abolished this special court in favor of review by the Judicial Conference, 
Congress retained the idea of an independent review body consisting of Article 
III judges.116 
 
 106. 842 F.2d 487 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
 107. 667 F.2d 188 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
 108. 569 F.2d 607 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
 109. McBryde IV, 264 F.3d at 59.  The Supreme Court has echoed the essence of this 
principle in Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603 (1988) (construing § 102(c) of the National 
Security Act of 1947 in conjunction with 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) and holding that a discharged 
employee’s constitutional claims were judicially reviewable under 5 U.S.C. § 706) (citing 
Robinson, 415 U.S. at 373-74). 
  The majority in McBryde IV conceded that the Supreme Court decision in Traynor v. 
Turnage, 485 U.S. 535, 542-45 (1988), may have subverted the principle of the Ralpho trilogy by 
viewing the Robinson decision, which was the source of the principle, as deriving more from 
statutory language permitting review of challenges on the facial constitutionality of statutes being 
applied and less from the notion that constitutional challenges occupy a special status.  McBryde 
IV, 264 F.3d at 59-60.  Nevertheless, the majority assumed that the Ralpho trilogy principle 
remained in full effect for the purposes of its argument.  Id. at 60. 
 110. See Griffith, 842 F.2d at 490 (citing Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-
454, 92 Stat. 1119 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 7123(a) (Supp. III 1983))); Ungar, 667 
F.2d at 192-93 (citing 22 U.S.C. § 1631o(c) (1976)); Ralpho, 569 F.2d at 613 (citing 50 U.S.C. § 
2020 (1972)). 
 111. Griffith, 842 F.2d at 494-95; Ungar, 667 F.2d at 195-96; Ralpho, 569 F.2d at 621-22. 
 112. Id. 
 113. McBryde IV, 264 F.3d at 60-61. 
 114. See supra Part III(A). 
 115. McBryde IV, 264 F.3d at 60 (citing 125 CONG. REC. 30,050/1 (1979) (statement of Sen. 
DeConcini)). 
 116. Id. at 60-61; see supra Part III(A). 
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The majority offered two final arguments in support of the position that 
section 372(c)(10) of the Act clearly and convincingly precludes review of as-
applied constitutional claims.117 First, while agencies normally lack 
jurisdiction to adjudicate the constitutionality of congressional enactments, 
they are obliged to tackle properly presented constitutional claims that refrain 
from challenging agency actions ordered by Congress.118  According to the 
majority, Congress did not withdraw this obligation from the Judicial 
Conference.119  Second, since a sanctioned judge may petition the Judicial 
Conference for review of all claims except facial challenges to the Act, to 
interpret section 372(c)(10) to permit review of as-applied challenges by 
traditional courts would result in substantial redundancy.120 
By holding that section 372(c)(10) barred review of Judge McBryde’s as-
applied constitutional claims, the majority sought to further what it viewed as 
the objectives of this provision of the Act.121  These objectives included 
conforming to Robinson, fulfilling both the presumption in favor of access to 
Article III review of constitutional challenges and the rule dictating that 
agencies avoid unconstitutional applications not congressionally mandated, 
and preventing unnecessary prolongation of the disciplinary process.122 
B. Tatel’s Dissent 
The preclusion clause of the Act operated as the point of contention 
between the majority opinion and Judge Tatel’s dissent.123  Judge Tatel argued: 
(i) that the preclusion clause did not bar judicial review of as-applied 
challenges; (ii) that the Judicial Council of the Fifth Circuit’s Report was 
ambiguous as to what conduct of Judge McBryde was clearly abusive; (iii) that 
using such an ambiguous Council Report as a foundation for sanctions risks 
chilling judges’ ability to manage courtrooms effectively; and (iv) that a new 
standard by which to sanction judges should be employed by the Act.124 
Judge Tatel, like the majority, relied upon the Ralpho trilogy in analyzing 
section 372(c)(10).125  In Ungar and Ralpho, the D.C. Circuit found statutes 
 
 117. Id. at 62. 
 118. Id. (citing Graceba Total Communications, Inc. v. F.C.C., 115 F.3d 1038, 1042 (D.C. 
Cir. 1997)). 
 119. Id.  The concept of judicial councils and the Judicial Conference as administrative 
agencies will be explored in Part V(A). 
 120. Id.  Substantial redundancy is naturally regarded by the Court as an implausible 
legislative purpose. 
 121. Id. at 63. 
 122. Id. 
 123. See id. at 73 (Tatel, J., dissenting). 
 124. Id. at 69, 80 (Tatel, J., dissenting). 
 125. Id. at 73-76 (Tatel, J., dissenting). 
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containing language just as preclusive as that of section 372(c)(10) inadequate 
to prevent review of as-applied constitutional challenges.126  Judge Tatel 
attacked the majority’s inference, formed from S. 1873 and its accompanying 
legislative history, that Congress intended preclusion of as-applied claims, by 
noting that both Griffith and Ungar refrained from considering such inferences 
from prior versions of bills as adequately clear evidence of congressional intent 
to bar review of as-applied claims.127 
Griffith and Ungar also undermined the majority’s belief that preclusion of 
constitutional claims would further the statutory purpose of preventing undue 
prolongation of the disciplinary process.128  In each case, the D.C. Circuit 
found review preclusion statutes intended to accomplish similar goals 
insufficient to prove unequivocal congressional intent to bar judicial review of 
as-applied constitutional challenges.129 
The legislative history of the Act, moreover, implied movement away from 
preclusion.130  Senator DeConcini informed Congress that it may safely 
preclude judicial review of constitutional claims under Robinson only if 
 
 126. Ungar v. Smith, 667 F.2d 188, 193 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (determinations made under 22 
U.S.C. § 1631o(c) were to be “final” and “not . . .  subject to review by any court”); Ralpho, 569 
F.2d at 613 (the statute provided that “[administrative decisions] shall be final and conclusive for 
all purposes, notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary[,] and not subject to 
review”). 
 127. McBryde IV, 264 F.3d at 74 (Tatel, J., dissenting). 
  In Griffith v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, the Senate bill established that 
decisions of the Federal Labor Relations Authority would be final and conclusive and thus not 
subject to judicial review, yet an exception existed for constitutional questions.  842 F.2d 487, 
495 (D.C. Cir. 1988).  The conference committee elected to reject the House’s proposal for 
extensive judicial review and generally to adopt the Senate’s restrictive methodology, however in 
the process it eliminated without explanation the exception for constitutional questions.  Id.  The 
D.C. Circuit held that “[t]his silent deletion [was] not enough . . . to support an inference of intent 
to preclude constitutional claims.”  Id. 
  In Ungar, the issue was whether Justice Department decisions concerning claims for the 
return of assets vested in the Office of Alien Property were subject to judicial review.  667 F.2d at 
190, 193.  In determining that the finality clause of 22 U.S.C. §1631 did not bar judicial review of 
as-applied claims, the D.C. Circuit stated that “[a]n earlier version of the bill . . .  included an 
elaborate scheme for trial of just-compensation claims in the Court of Claims” which was 
“deleted on the House floor for reasons that are not wholly plain.”  Id. at 195 n.2.  The Court was 
“not willing to regard this as clear evidence of Congressional intent” to preclude review.  Id. 
 128. McBryde IV, 264 F.3d at 76 (Tatel, J., dissenting). 
 129. See Griffith, 842 F.2d at 495 (Congress’ plan to limit judicial review of FLRA decisions 
was intended to advance “finality, speed[,] and economy,” yet as-applied constitutional claims 
were nevertheless not precluded); Ungar, 667 F.2d at 195-96 (Congress intended the review 
preclusion provision to reduce delay in adjudicating claims under the Trading with the Enemy 
Act, but such intent did not operate as a “clear expression of Congress’ desire to prevent the 
courts from passing upon . . .  constitutional claims”). 
 130. McBryde IV, 264 F.3d at 74 (Tatel, J., dissenting). 
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“litigants at some point [have] access to an Article III court.”131  In vesting 
review of judicial council decisions in the Judicial Conference rather than in a 
special court, the House Judiciary Committee noted that it was shifting from a 
“court” to an “administrative model.”132  Upon the Act’s return to the Senate, 
Senator DeConcini reiterated this notion of movement towards an 
administrative model by explaining that the Judicial Conference, unlike the 
Senate’s proposed Court on Judicial Conduct and Disability, was not an 
independent review court.133  According to Judge Tatel, these events of the 
Act’s legislative history suggest Congress would have understood that vesting 
review power in the Judicial Conference exposed judicial council disciplinary 
decisions to constitutional attack in the federal courts.134 
By concluding that section 372(c)(10) fails to preclude review of as-
applied constitutional challenges against judicial council sanctions, Judge Tatel 
felt compelled to address the merits of Judge McBryde’s as-applied claims.135  
He found the Report of the Judicial Council of the Fifth Circuit unclear 
because it neglected to explain thoroughly and explicitly the ways in which 
Judge McBryde’s behavior deviated from permissible exercises of judicial 
power.136  The Judicial Council of the Fifth Circuit, Judge Tatel concluded, 
violated the Constitution by infringing upon judicial independence in imposing 
sanctions on Judge McBryde.137 
Judge Tatel therefore proposed that judicial council sanctions “should be 
employed only for conduct that, viewed from the perspective of reasonable 
judges and lawyers, is clearly abusive toward counsel or clearly prejudicial to 
the adversarial process.138  Such an arduous, objective standard is necessary for 
four reasons: (1) absent a precise standard, judicial councils could more easily 
employ their disciplinary power to sanction nonabusive judicial conduct; (2) 
some judicial council members, e.g. appellate judges, may have a dearth of 
experience in facing aggressive trial lawyers who push the limits of appropriate 
 
 131. 125 CONG. REC. 30,050/1 (1979) (statement of Sen. DeConcini). 
 132. See H.R. REP. NO. 96-1313, at 14 (stating that this “legislation creates much more of an 
‘inquisitorial-administrative’ model than an ‘accusatorial-adversary’ one”); see also infra Part 
V(A). 
 133. 126 CONG. REC. 28,090 (1980) (statement of Sen. DeConcini). 
 134. McBryde IV, 264 F.3d at 75 (Tatel, J., dissenting).  Judge Tatel also believed these 
legislative historical events constitute “primary evidence” of legislative intent that outweighs any 
inferences the majority drew from whatever functional redundancy which may result from 
concluding that federal courts may review as- applied challenges to § 372(c).  Id. at 76 (Tatel, J., 
dissenting). 
 135. Id. at 76 (Tatel, J., dissenting). 
 136. Id. at 82-84 (Tatel, J., dissenting). 
 137. Id. at 69 (Tatel, J., dissenting). 
 138. Id. at 80 (Tatel, J., dissenting). 
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advocacy; (3) judicial discipline can chill the exercise of judicial discretion; 
and (4) sanctions can potentially damage an individual’s reputation.139 
V.  ANALYSIS 
A. The Preclusion Clause 
After reviewing both the majority and dissenting opinions in McBryde IV, 
the question of which approach to the preclusion clause of the Act with respect 
to as-applied constitutional challenges is most accurate remains unanswered.  
Since only a few reported cases have even attempted to construe the preclusion 
clause,140 each opinion relies adroitly on the legislative history of the Act in 
resolving the issue.141  While neither opinion appears to emphatically resolve 
the issue while sufficiently rebutting the other side’s arguments, upon careful 
examination Judge Tatel’s approach more accurately pursues the proper line of 
reasoning.  The majority in McBryde IV failed to explain adequately the 
inconsistency between its interpretation of the congressional intent underlying 
section 372(c)(10) and the Supreme Court’s mandate in Robinson142 that 
constitutional challengers must be granted access to an Article III court. 
Judge Tatel emphasized Congress’ awareness of the Robinson issue by 
virtue of Senator DeConcini’s introduction of the report prepared by Johnny H. 
Killian, an American law expert at the Library of Congress.143  This fact is 
indeed important to the resolution of the preclusion clause issue, for it is the 
first step in understanding the congressional intent to allow for judicial review 
of as-applied claims under the Act.  Judge Tatel began to take the second step 
by identifying the Judicial Conference as an administrative body,144 however 
his reasons for such an identification could have been far more formidable. 
Stated simply, the Judicial Conference is undoubtedly an administrative 
body145 and Congress knew that vesting authority to review disciplinary 
 
 139. Id. at 80-81 (Tatel, J., dissenting). 
 140. See McBryde II, 120 F.3d at 520 n.1 (noting in dicta that any arguments “concerning 
dismissal of Judicial Conference proceedings should be directed to that body and not to this 
court”); Hastings I, 593 F. Supp. 1371, 1377-78 (D.D.C. 1984), aff’d in part and vacated in part, 
770 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
 141. See supra Part IV. 
 142. See supra Part IV(A). 
 143. See McBryde IV, 264 F.3d at 74-75 (Tatel, J., dissenting); 125 CONG. REC. 30,050/1 
(1979) (statement of Sen. DeConcini). 
 144. See McBryde IV, 264 F.3d at 75 (Tatel, J., dissenting); see also supra Part IV(B). 
 145. Congress, the courts, and scholars agree that the Judicial Conference and the judicial 
councils are administrative bodies.  See, e.g., Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 
435 n.2 (1985) (the judicial councils “exist ‘to provide an administrative remedy for misconduct 
of a judge for which no judicial remedy is available’”); Chandler, 398 U.S. at 86 n.7 (“the 
[j]udicial [c]ouncil was intended to be . . . an administrative body functioning in a very limited 
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decisions in an administrative body would not satisfy Robinson.146  An 
administrative body is hardly an Article III court.147  Accordingly, when 
Congress elected to grant the power to review judicial council administrative 
decisions to the Judicial Conference, it intended to permit as-applied and facial 
constitutional challenges to the Act in federal courts.  Any other interpretation 
would mean that Congress intentionally ignored the Supreme Court opinion in 
Robinson.  Aside from his lack of emphasis on the Judicial Conference qua 
administrative agency, Judge Tatel’s dissent failed to address a significant 
argument made by the majority.  The majority stated that administrative 
agencies have an obligation to address constitutional claims that do not 
challenge agency actions ordered by Congress under Graceba.148  The majority 
then concluded that Congress has not withdrawn this obligation from the 
Judicial Conference.149  This argument, however, assumes that all as-applied 
constitutional claims do not challenge agency actions mandated by Congress.  
The case of Judge McBryde demonstrates that such an assumption is false. 
Judge McBryde’s second as-applied constitutional claim consisted of the 
argument that the methods employed by the Judicial Council of the Fifth 
Circuit and the Judicial Conference were especially invasive and constituted a 
violation of judicial independence.150  Yet it was Congress who established the 
standard and methodology to be used by judicial councils and the Judicial 
Conference in disciplinary proceedings initiated pursuant to section 372(c).151  
In effect, therefore, Congress mandated Judicial Council and Judicial 
Conference actions in the McBryde saga by prescribing the agencies’ modus 
operandi in section 372(c).  Graceba will not apply to Judge McBryde’s 
second as-applied claim because the claim challenges actions and procedures 
mandated by Congress. 
 
area in a  narrow sense as a ‘board of directors’ for the circuit”); Henry v. U.S., 432 F.2d 114, 
119-20 (9th Cir. 1970) (“[i]t is true that members of a Court of Appeals, meeting as a Judicial 
Council, exercise certain supervisory powers for the expeditious administration of the business of 
the courts within its circuit, but they act as a council, not a court); H.R. REP. NO. 96-1313, at 4 
(“rather than creat[ing] luxurious mechanisms such as special courts and commissions—with all 
the trappings of the adversary process, including legal counsel, written transcripts, discovery and 
cross-examination—the [House version of the bill] emphasize[s] placing primary responsibility 
within the judicial branch of government”); Burbank, supra note 66, at 306; Re, supra note 82, at 
250. 
 146. See supra Part IV(B). 
 147. Senator DeConcini has also uttered this tautology, see supra note 131. 
 148. See McBryde IV, 264 F.3d at 62; see also supra Part IV(A). 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. at 58. 
 151. While judicial councils and the Judicial Conference are free to prescribe rules for the 
conduct of proceedings under § 372(c)(11), it remains clear that judicial councils and the Judicial 
Conference are to use the standard provided in § 372(c)(1) in evaluating judicial conduct. 
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An interpretation of the preclusion clause that allows for preclusion of as-
applied constitutional claims is irreconcilable with the Act’s legislative history 
and the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence.152  Such an interpretation, moreover, 
clears the way for unbridled misapplication of the Act by judicial councils. 
B. Proposed Standard for the Act 
Even if the preclusion clause of the Act does in fact bar judicial review of 
as-applied constitutional claims, the Act remains susceptible to recurring, 
unconstitutional misapplication by judicial councils and the Judicial 
Conference.153  The problem lies in the Act’s imprecise standard, which calls 
for sanctioning judicial conduct that is “prejudicial to the effective and 
expeditious administration of the business of the courts.”154  Without a more 
exact standard by which to evaluate judicial conduct, the independence of the 
judiciary may continue to be compromised by decisions like McBryde IV, 
which in effect validated an unconstitutional application of the Act. 
If the Act is amended to clarify the standard of section 372(c)(1), what 
should the new standard be?  The majority in McBryde IV, while approving the 
Judicial Conference’s authority to sanction Judge McBryde and thus implicitly 
confirming the status quo, suggested a baseline standard “that a judge should 
demonstrate at least a modicum of civility and respect towards the 
professionals with whom he or she works.”155  Judge Tatel, on the other hand, 
proposed a reasonableness standard based upon the perspectives of judges and 
lawyers.156  Somewhere between these recommendations lie proposals offered 
by scholars for amendments to the Act’s standard of discipline.157 
 
 152. See, e.g., Robinson, 415 U.S. at 367; Webster, 486 U.S. at 603. 
 153. See Patrick D. McCalla, Note, Judicial Disciplining of Federal Judges is Constitutional, 
62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1263, 1291-92 (1989) (arguing that “[a] loosely defined disciplinary standard 
creates a risk of unequal application and unjustified extension to situations previously considered 
outside the jurisdiction of the Judicial Council”); see also RUSSELL R. WHEELER & A. LEO 
LEVIN, JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE AND REMOVAL IN THE UNITED STATES (1987).  But see Carol T. 
Rieger, The Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act: Will Judges 
Judge Judges? 37 EMORY L.J. 45, 56 (1988) (arguing the standard is clear if limited to criminal 
conduct, impeachable offenses and violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct). 
 154. § 372(c)(1); see supra note 8.  Congress has provided little assistance in clarifying the 
disciplinary standard.  Apparently, however, § 372(c)(1) does include impeachable behavior, 
criminal violations, and physical or mental disability.  See H.R. REP. NO. 96-1313, at 10. 
 155. McBryde IV, 264 F.3d at 56. 
 156. Id. at 80 (Tatel, J., dissenting); see supra Part IV(B). 
 157. See, e.g., Drew E. Edwards, Comment, Judicial Misconduct and Politics in the Federal 
System: A Proposal for Revising the Judicial Councils Act, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1071, 1090 (1987) 
(proposing the imposition of discipline only when a judge violates ethical standards such as those 
elaborated in the American Bar Association’s Code of Judicial Conduct); McCalla, supra note 
153, at 1292-93 (proposing a functional standard by which “a complaint may be filed alleging 
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The baseline standard offered by the majority in McBryde IV is too broad 
inasmuch as it fails to uphold the statutory goals of judicial accountability and 
ethics.158  Almost any behavior may be deemed to constitute “a modicum of 
civility and respect.”  The standard, furthermore, would do nothing to regulate 
misconduct that is not blatantly disrespectful to others, e.g. subtle bias.  The 
rigorous standard proposed by Judge Tatel is more appropriate, however he 
might not have gone far enough.  A reasonableness standard would provide the 
exactness necessary to further most of the goals of the Act while avoiding 
unconstitutional applications, but Judge Tatel omitted a crucial perspective—
that of the litigant.159 
The Act’s standard should be such that sanctions will be employed only for 
conduct that, viewed from the perspective of reasonable judges, lawyers, and 
litigants, is clearly abusive toward counsel or clearly prejudicial to the 
adversarial process.  A reasonable litigant means a person whose 
understanding of the law encompasses an overarching conceptualization of 
substantial justice and the legal precepts applicable to her action as expounded 
by reasonable counsel. 
The “reasonable litigant” addendum to Judge Tatel’s proposed standard is 
necessary for three reasons.  First, Congress identified judicial accountability 
to the public as an objective of the Act.160  Judges, after all, are public servants 
and have an interest in ensuring that the system they exemplify is at all times 
publicly exonerated.161  In addition, litigants are affected most by the outcome 
of the case.  As the McBryde saga has demonstrated, a maverick judge may 
impede zealous advocacy, thereby directly impacting the outcome for the 
litigant.162  Finally, an even more rigorous standard than that espoused by 
Judge Tatel is necessary to filter out frivolous claims.  During the year ending 
September 30, 2000, the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts reported 696 
complaints filed under section 372(c) and another 715 complaints resolved or 
 
misconduct in office or persistent failure to perform the duties of the office due to physical or 
mental disability or otherwise”). 
  The problem with the Edwards standard is that it fails to promote judicial competence 
and focuses too narrowly on proscribing unethical behavior.  The functional standard proposed by 
McCalla is deficient insofar as it allows a McBryde-like judge to turn his courtroom into a 
despotic kingdom, where the duties of the court are indeed performed, albeit with a severe chill 
on advocacy. 
 158. See H.R. REP. NO. 96-1313, at 1. 
 159. See McBryde IV, 264 F.3d at 80 (Tatel, J., dissenting); see supra Part IV(B). 
 160. See H.R. REP. NO. 96-1313, at 1. 
 161. See In re Certain Complaints Under Investigation by an Investigating Comm. of the 
Judicial Council of the Eleventh Circuit, 783 F.2d 1488, 1507 (11th Cir. 1986). 
 162. See McBryde III, 83 F. Supp. at 146. 
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concluded.163  A standard demanding satisfaction from a reasonable litigant’s 
perspective may reduce the expense and disruption associated with frivolous 
claims filed under the Act.164 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The story of Judge McBryde raises a disturbing question concerning many 
of the claims of judicial misconduct that are dismissed each year by chief 
judges and judicial councils.165  How many of those claims are dismissed based 
on a misunderstanding of the Act’s standard?  The goals of the Act and public 
confidence in the judicial system certainly cannot be advanced by applications 
of the Act’s machinery and standard that unconstitutionally infringe upon 
judicial independence.166  Following McBryde IV, federal judges can only 
wonder what conduct is sufficiently prejudicial under the Act to trigger 
disciplinary proceedings.  The judicial councils may now continue to apply the 
equivocal disciplinary standard provided in the Act, with only the Judicial 
Conference, reviewing under the same standard, as a safeguard against 
improper applications. 
To assure that judicial independence remains a constant, unobstructed 
feature of the judicial system, Congress should amend section 372(c)(1) of the 
Act to provide that conduct clearly abusive toward counsel or clearly 
prejudicial to the adversarial process in the eyes of reasonable judges, lawyers, 
and litigants may be subject to discipline.  Judges held by this standard will 
remain accountable to the public whom they serve and will be free to 
administer the business of their courts as autonomously as the Framers of the 
Constitution imagined. 
BENJAMIN F. WESTHOFF* 
 
 
 163. See LEONIDAS RALPH MECHAM, 2000 REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR (2000), TABLE S-22, 
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2000/tables/s22sep00.pdf (Report of Complaints 
Filed and Action Taken Under Authority of Title 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)). 
 164. For an outstanding analysis of the effects of the administration of the Act on the courts, 
see Jeffrey N. Barr & Thomas E. Willging, Decentralized Self-Regulation, Accountability, and 
Judicial Independence Under the Federal Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, U. PA. L. 
REV. 25, 142-79 (1993). 
 165. During the year concluding September 30, 2000, chief judges dismissed 359 complaints 
and judicial councils dismissed 354 others.  Mecham, supra note 163. 
 166. For a field study on the impact of the Act, pre-McBryde IV, on judicial independence, 
see Barr & Willging, supra note 164, at 173-77. 
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